We present a general model for the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma and study the e!ect of errors. We "nd that cooperative strategies that can resist invasion by defectors are optimistic (make high initial o!ers), generous (always o!er more cooperation than the partner did in the previous round) and uncompromising (o!er full cooperation only if the partner does). A necessary condition for the emergence of cooperation in the continuous Prisoner's Dilemma with noise is b(1!p)'c, where b and c denote, respectively, the bene"t and cost of cooperation, while p is the error rate. This relation can be reformulated as an error threshold: cooperation can only emerge if the probability of making a mistake is below a critical value. We note, however, that cooperation in the continuous Prisoner's Dilemma with noise does not seem to be evolutionarily stable: while it is possible to "nd cooperative strategies that resist invasion by defectors, such cooperators are generally invaded by more cooperative strategies which eventually yield to defectors. Thus, the long-term evolution of the continuous Prisoner's Dilemma is either characterized by unending cycles or by stable polymorphisms of cooperators and defectors.
Introduction
Being &&human'' can apply to a spectrum of behaviors, but often this phrase refers simply to the unavoidable probability of making mistakes. In this paper, we incorporate continuous variability and inconsistency into the classic mathematical model of cooperation, the Prisoner's Dilemma (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Trivers, 1971; Smale, 1980; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) .
Recent papers have investigated the possibility of extending this classical game by allowing a variable degree of cooperation, with payo!s scaled accordingly (Verhoe!, 1993; Doebeli & Knowlton, 1998; Roberts & Sherratt, 1998; Killingback et al., 1999 ; see also Smale, 1980; Frean, 1996) . We have presented a general model for the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma (Wahl & Nowak, 1999) which describes a continuous three-dimensional strategy space, and have studied the evolutionary outcome when a wide range of strategies play a game of alternating moves (Frean, 1994; Nowak & Sigmund, 1994) against each other. Here we study the e!ects of &&noise'' on this general model, that is, we assume that players will occasionally misinterpret an opponent's move, and study the outcome of the game using both evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982) and adaptive dynamics (Nowak & Sigmund, 1990; Metz et al., 1996; Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998) . In the discrete Prisoner's Dilemma, this type of stochasticity may reveal crucial di!erences between strategies which are otherwise neutral with respect to each other (Nowak & Sigmund, 1990 , 1992 .
The Continuous Prisoner:s Dilemma
We have proposed a general model of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, in which both the costs and bene"ts of cooperation vary continuously (Wahl & Nowak, 1999) . In brief, player 1 moves x in a given round (where x is in the interval [0, 1]), entailing cost !cx to player 1, and bene-"t bx to player 2, with b'c.
We consider linear reactive strategies y"S(x), where y is the response to an opponent's previous move x. Each strategy S is de"ned by a slope, k, an intercept, d, and a starting move x . Where kx#d'1 we set y"1, and likewise where kx#d(0, we set y"0. This subset of all S can be pictured as the set of straight lines which have a non-empty intersection with the unit square. We use the notation S IBV to describe a given strategy (abbreviated to S IB to describe a class of strategies which di!er only in x ). Clearly, the strategy S or y"1 corresponds to indiscriminate cooperation (denoted AllC), while S or y"0 corresponds to indiscriminate defection (denoted AllD). The strategy S , or y"x with the starting move x "1, is analagous to Tit-for-Tat in the discrete case; this strategy lies on the line of identity and is denoted I.
STRATEGY FAMILIES
The space of all possible strategies is a threedimensional polyhydron in k, d and x . We subdivide this space based on the qualitative features of the strategies, as illustrated in Fig. 1 of the companion paper (Wahl & Nowak, 1999) . Strategy families, denoted P or N, have positive or negative slopes, respectively, and repeated rounds of a game between two members of this family move the play towards the value given by the superscript. P is the set of all cooperators, i.e. the set of strategies for which S(x)5x for all x. These strategies lie entirely on or above the line of identity, and repeated rounds between two cooperators move the play closer to one. We de"ne defectors analogously as those strategies which lie completely below the line of identity, for which S(x)(x for all x; the set of defectors is the family P.
THE ERROR DISTRIBUTION
It is clear that a large number of interesting strategies, for instance all those for which S(1)"1 and x "1, are e!ectively identical to each other in the game without errors. This is because successive moves between two such players are always S(1)"1, regardless of the value of S(x) over the remainder of the interval [0, 1). These apparently equivalent strategies, however, may be markedly di!erent in their response during an error-prone game.
We model the continuous Prisoner's Dilemma with errors in the following way. Let p represent the probability that an error occurs. With probability p, a previous move is misinterpreted, and instead of responding to x with move y"S(x), a player will respond to y"S(u), where u is a random variable. Note that this is slightly di!erent from modelling y as a random variable, since in the latter case players could make &&mistakes'' that are inconsistent with their own strategies (see the Discussion section).
In this paper, we have treated the case when u is distributed uniformly over [0, 1] . In this case, the true value of the previous move, x, has no bearing on the distribution of y"S(u). Another possible model would be the case when u is normally distributed around a mean value of x.
THE PAYOFF FUNCTION
We de"ne a payo! function, F(S, S), which corresponds to the mean payo! per round that strategy S receives when playing against S. The payo! is clearly a function of the slopes, intercepts and starting moves of the two strategies, of the cost c and bene"t b, and of the total number of rounds in the game. In this paper, we model games in which there is a constant probability of an additional round between two players; we let nN denote the average number of rounds per game, and the probability of a further move after each round of the game is then given by (1!1/nN ).
Because the payo! will also depend on whether S or S moves "rst, we de"ne the payo! function 324 FIG. 1. Payo! against self without and with errors. The payo! F(S, S) is shown for a game of 20 rounds on average, with b"2, c"1 and p"0 (upper panel) or p"0.1 (lower panel). We set x "1 for all strategies. The positions of strategy families are depicted in Fig. 1 in the companion paper (Wahl & Nowak, 1999) . Note that the high payo! received by the family of cooperators, P, is maintained in the game with errors, while the payo! for family P is greatly reduced. The payo! surface in P is #at in the game without errors but has a gradient in the lower panel (more cooperative strategies do slightly better).
as the average payo! between these two cases. As a limiting case, we sometimes consider the payo! of an in"nitely iterated game (payo! averaged over n rounds as nPR). For example, in the in"nite game without errors, F(AllC, AllC)" (b!c), and likewise F(AllD, AllD)"0. We also "nd that F(I, I)"(b!c), because the starting move for I is de"ned to be 1. For other strategies which lie on the identity line, the payo! when Figure 1 shows the payo! function for each strategy family, for the game without errors (upper panel) or with errors (lower panel; p"0.1). The surface plots the payo! each strategy receives when playing a game of 20 rounds on average (nN "20) against itself, for the case of the most generous starting move, x "1. We "nd that cooperators (family P) continue to achieve high payo!s in the error-prone game, and that errors are most devastating for family P. Note that within P the payo! surface is #at (strategies are neutral with respect to each other) in the game without errors, but there is a slight gradient in the payo! surface for the error-prone game (more cooperative strategies do slightly better).
Payo4s between Strategies=Analytical Results
We can derive the payo! function between several strategy families analytically. Note that we have not determined an analytical expression for the payo! between two arbitrary linear reactive strategies, but in the following sections, we treat a limited number of salient cases.
In the limiting case of an in"nite game with errors, F(AllC, AllC) is clearly equal to (b!c), and likewise F(AllD, AllD)"0; the responses of these strategies are una!ected by errors. Thus, AllD is able to invade and take over AllC, regardless of the error rate. The payo! for strategy I vs. itself, however, will be a!ected by stochasticity. Each error will move the play to a new value uniformly distributed across [0, 1] and the mean payo! F(I, I) will equal (1/2)(b!c).
I VS. AllC
When AllC plays I, AllC will always pay the total cost, c, but will receive the complete bene"t, b, for only a fraction of the moves given by 1!p. Occasionally, for a fraction of the moves given by p, a random error will occur, and I will play u instead of 1. The mean value of u for this fraction of the moves will be 1/2. Thus, we "nd that the total payo! AllC receives when playing I in the in"nite game with errors is CONTINUOUS PRISONER'S DILEMMA WITH ERRORS given by
It follows that
From these values it is clear that F(I, AllC) ' F(AllC, AllC) , and so I is always able to invade a population of indiscriminate cooperators. AllC is resistant against takeover by I, however, if
which reduces to
Thus, in the in"nite game with errors, I is not able to take over a population of indiscriminate cooperators if the bene"t, times a quality factor given by the probability of interpreting a move correctly, is greater than the cost. We should also note that when condition (4) is met, AllC can invade a population of I, but F(AllC, AllC) is always less than F(I, AllC), so that AllC can never dominate I. We can rewrite inequality (4) in terms of an &&error threshold'':
While the error rate, p, is below this threshold, AllC is not dominated by I. If the population is mixed between AllC and I, and the frequency of I in the total population is g, the growth rate of I will be proportional to gF(I, I)#(1!g)F(I, AllC), while the growth rate of AllC will be proportional to gF(AllC, I) #(1!g)F(AllC, AllC). For the growth of I to equal the growth of AllC, we "nd
Thus, when the error rate is close to zero, the frequency of I in the equilibrium between AllC and I approaches zero, but as the error rate increases, the frequency of I increases, and reaches 100% when p is equal to 1!c/b. To summarize, we "nd that I and AllC are in equilibrium only if condition (4) is met and p(1!c/b, otherwise I dominates AllC.
I VS. AllD
We can likewise examine the possible outcomes when I plays AllD. For the limiting case of an in"nite game with errors, we "nd that F(AllD, I)"bp/2 and F(I, AllD)"!cp/2. Since F(AllD, AllD)"0'!cp/2, we see that a single player with strategy I can never invade a population of defectors. If, however, the frequency of I in the total population is h, and the population is mixed between AllD and I, then the growth rate of I will exceed the growth of AllD when
We note that h can only be greater than this threshold if the right-hand side of inequality (8) 
PAYOFFS FOR P I\I
Results for the continuous Prisoner's Dilemma without errors (Wahl & Nowak, 1999) indicate that a large fraction of successful strategies may be cooperative, especially if the bene"ts of cooperation are high. With b"5 and c"1, we found that 48% of all generations had payo!s greater than 90% of the maximum payo!, (b!c). We also noted that over 30% of the members of family P lay in a narrow band along the boundary of P and M, a region of apparent Nash equilibria.
We denote the set of cooperative strategies along this boundary P I\I , since d"1!k for this sub-family, and we note that for these strategies 0(k(1. We are interested in the evolutionary dynamics surrounding P I\I , and have derived the payo! for the error-prone game between this sub-family and a number of other strategies of interest, for the limiting case of an in"nite game.
When P I\I plays AllD, the bene"t to P I\I is always 0, and the cost is 1!k for a fraction of the moves given by 1!p. When an error occurs, strategy P I\I will mistakenly play P I\I (u) . Since u is uniformly distributed, the mean value of P I\I (u) is just the mean value of P I\I (x) for x3 [0, 1] , or 1!(k/2) (this is simply the area under the strategy in the unit square). This gives
and similarly
By similar arguments, we can derive the mean payo! when P I\I plays AllC, "nding
and
To understand the system further, we derive the payo! when P I\I plays itself. This works out to be (see Appendix A)
For the game between P I\I and I we "nd (see Appendix B)
These results are summarized in the payo! matrix shown in Table 1 
When k"1, this condition is identical to inequality (4), and we also note that for 0(k(1, inequality (4) is necessary for condition (16) to be met. Inequality (16) can also be written in terms of an error threshold
This condition gives a lower limit on k, and intuitively it can be understood that if the strategy gives too much in response to total defection CONTINUOUS PRISONER'S DILEMMA WITH ERRORS 
, it is vulnerable to invasion by AllD. We can also see that if AllD invades, it dominates. Once again we "nd [inequality (16)] that the relevant factor is whether the weighted bene"t outscales the cost of cooperation. Conversely, we can solve for the starting frequency, f, that would be required for a small number of players with strategy P I\I to invade and take over a population of AllD. Comparing the growth rates of P I\I and AllD in a mixed population of the two, we "nd
Again we see that AllD is stable against invasion by (16) is not met, I can invade a population of P I\I , but I can never take over P I\I . Conversely, we "nd that P I\I is always able to invade I, and can take over I when condition (16) is met. Thus, P I\I invades and takes over I when the error rate is su$cienty low, while at higher error rates, an equilibrium between I and P I\I is possible. The frequency of P I\I in this equilibrium is given by
When k"0, this frequency reduces to 1!g where g is de"ned in eqn (6); the situation is e!ectively AllC vs. I in this limiting case.
P I\I vs. AllC
We likewise "nd that AllC can only invade a population of P I\I under the condition
Since AllC is never stable against invasion by P I\I , P I\I will form an equilibrium when condition (20) is met, otherwise P I\I will dominate AllC.
OTHER STRATEGY SUBFAMILIES
We have derived analytical expressions for the payo! between AllD, AllC, I and two other strategy subfamilies. The cooperative strategies, denoted P I , are those strategies that intersect (0, 0) on the unit square (1(k(R), while the family P B describes strategies that are parallel to, but above, the line of identity (0(d(1). For the family P I , we "nd that AllD can never invade a population of P I , while both I and 328 
AllC can invade under the condition
Strategy AllC does not dominate P I , but I dominates P I when
The analytical results for payo!s between P I , AllD, AllC and I are shown in Table 2 . Figure 2 illustrates the payo! each of these strategies receive when playing P I ; simulated (open circles) and analytical (solid lines) results show excellent agreement.
For the family P B the analysis is more complex, but again we "nd similar general features: these cooperators can be invaded by AllD when d is greater than some threshold, and once invaded the population is taken over by AllD; a (di!erent, in this case) threshold value determines whether I can invade the population; a third threshold determines whether AllC can invade; and both I and AllC are unable to dominate.
Adaptive Dynamics
These analytical results suggest that equilibrium states are possible between AllC, I and a range of cooperative strategies between the two. Within this cooperative space, a number of strategies are certainly vulnerable to exploitation by AllD and presumably by more sophisticated defectors. We are interested in the evolutionary dynamics of this system: does a population of such strategies evolve towards cooperation in the long run? And if so, does it become vulnerable to takeover by defectors?
THE EVOLUTION OF x
We begin by analysing adaptive changes in x , that is, we determine which starting move is &&best'' for a given strategy. To do this, we start with an initial strategy S IBV and consider a strategy S, identical to S except for a small perturbation in the starting move, x "x # x. If
F(S, S) 'F(S, S) and F(S, S)'F(S, S), it is
clear that S will invade and takeover a population of S: we let x replace x and continue. The results of these simulations are shown in Fig. 3 . Here we let S and S play 5000 games against each other, where each game has on average 20 rounds and p"0.05. These surfaces plot the steady-state values of x (xL ) when x is originally set to be 0 or 1 in the simulation.
We note that xL "1 is robust for much of the strategy space, and in particular we "nd a region in the upper corner of strategy family M for which x evolves to one, regardless of its initial value. The steady-state value of x for k(0 was zero, regardless of its initial value. These results were identical to those observed for the game without noise (Wahl & Nowak, 1999) , the only di!erence being the number of games (5000) CONTINUOUS PRISONER'S DILEMMA WITH ERRORS FIG. 2. Payo! vs. slope, k, for strategy family P I . The payo!s which P I , AllD, AllC and I receive when playing P I are shown, for b"2, c"1, p"0.1 and 1(k(100. Payo!s for an in"nitely iterated game were simulated by playing single 100 000 round games between P I and AllD, AllC or I for each value of k (*). These compare well with analytical predictions (**); equations are provided in Table 2. needed in simulating the error-prone game to ensure a smooth xL surface.
THE EVOLUTION OF k, d AND x
We repeated these simulations, allowing k, d and x to vary simultaneously. For each strategy S IBV , we considered strategies distributed in a sphere around that strategy, and accepted the parameter values of the strategy S with the highest payo! against S IBV , under the condition that strategy S is able to invade and take over a population of S. Figure 4 illustrates an example of evolution through strategy space, where a given starting strategy has been followed for 20 000 successful mutations. The circle on each graph shows the value of x for the strategy illustrated. We seeded the simulation with a highly cooperative strategy (k"0.6, d"0.7 and x "1), and set p"0.05. This cooperative strategy is remarkably stable; although d, k and x vary widely over the subsequent 18 000 mutations, the strategy remains entirely cooperative, S(x)*x for all x. Between mutations 18 000 and 18 600, however, the strategy rapidly mutates towards AllD. The detailed illustration of this evolution reveals that between mutations 18 100 and 18 200, k decreases, such that k#d is no longer greater than one. The strategy crosses the boundary from family P to was initially set to 0 or 1, respectively. Games which were 20 rounds long on average (nN "20) were modelled by simulating 100 rounds and weighting the payo! in round i by the probability that a game would last to round i, (1!(1/nN ))G\. We note that x ' "1 is robust for a signi"cant fraction of the strategy space.
family M. Once the strategy is a member of family M (with low k), x , k and d all evolve to zero; the steady state is AllD.
To examine the evolutionary trajectories through strategy space more generally, we seeded strategies at uniform intervals in k, d and x , and followed the evolution of each strategy for a small number of mutations. Figure 5 shows one plane through the results of this simulation, the d}k plane at the level x "1. Open circles show the initial positions of the strategies investigated. Lines indicate the direction of the evolution through strategy space. Where open circles appear without visible evolutionary trajectories in this plane, the trajectory is into the page; x evolves towards smaller values in regions P, P and N.
This "gure reveals a fairly complex set of trajectories on the x "1 plane. For the majority of strategies within P and M, and for all strategies in N, N and N, strategies evolve towards the lower left boundary of the space, or towards indiscriminate defection. For sections of P and M where k is su$ciently large, however, and for all of P, strategies evolve towards the upper left; they become more cooperative. This evolution, however, takes the strategy towards a region of P where x evolves towards lower values, and from there (as illustrated in Fig. 4) , the strategy evolves back into family M where there is a strong gradient towards AllD.
In the error-free game (Wahl & Nowak, 1999) , we observed a cooperative subfamily of apparent Nash equilibria along the boundary of families M and P when x "1. These strategies, denoted P I\I , fare better than near neighbors in family M when k'c/b, and are neutral with neighbors in P in the game without errors. Figure 5 indicates that strategies in this subfamily are not Nash equilibria in the error-prone game, but evolve away from the boundary of M and P. Appendix C shows that when k'c/b strategies along this boundary can be invaded by other members of family P; for smaller values of k, strategies along this boundary can be invaded by members of family M.
Stochastic Adaptive Dynamics in the Error-prone Game
To analyse the overall behavior of this system, we use a modi"cation of adaptive dynamics, in which a stochastic element is introduced to capture the e!ects of random drift (Wahl & Nowak, 1999) . We begin with a single strategy, S, and allow it to evolve by small random changes in k, CONTINUOUS PRISONER'S DILEMMA WITH ERRORS FIG. 4 . Strategy evolution. The evolution of a single cooperative strategy is shown; all three parameters of the starting strategy (k"0.6, d"0.7, x "1) were allowed to evolve. Each panel plots the value of S(x) for 0)x)1; the circle on each graph shows the value of x for the strategy illustrated. The top left panel plots the starting strategy and subsequent panels show the strategy after 1000}20 000 successful mutations. We used b"2, c"1, p"0.05 and nN "20 for these simulations. This strategy remains cooperative for 18 000 mutations, but eventually evolves towards AllD, a transition that occurs very quickly between mutations 18 200 and 18 600 (see detail).
d or x to a new strategy S. We let S replace S if
F(S, S)'F(S, S)
F(S, S)'F(S, S).
This assumes that the frequency of advantageous mutations is low compared to the rate at which "xation occurs, and is the standard transition rule of adaptive dynamics (Nowak & Sigmund, 1990; Metz et al., 1996; Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998) . To this standard rule, we add three &&stochastic'' rules (Wahl & Nowak, 1999) , which allow us to model "xation by a putative invader due to three e!ects: the chance extinction of one of two strategies at equilibrium; the chance extinction of one of two strategies which are neutral with respect to each other; and the chance #uctu-ation of the frequency of the putative invader past an invasion barrier. Finally, we periodically introduce new mutants by choosing k, d and x from random distributions, rather than constraining S to be a near neighbor of S. These mutant strategies are then accepted or rejected according to the same rules. Note that if S does not invade S, we rewrite S in the sequence of successful strategies, and generate a new S.
These transition rules allow us to &&explore'' the strategy space adaptively, by forming a discrete sequence of successful strategies. In the "nal adaptive sequence, the number of strategies and were allowed to evolve through two successful mutations; all three parameters of the starting strategies were allowed to evolve. For this "gure we used b"2, c"1, and p"0.05; strategies played 5000 games against each other with an average of 20 rounds per game. The "gure illustrates the d}k plane at the level x "1. Open circles show the initial positions of the strategies investigated, and these are connected by solid lines to the "nal position of the strategy after two mutations. Where open circles appear without visible evolutionary trajectories in this plane, the trajectory is into the page; x evolves towards smaller values in these regions. For the majority of strategies within P and M, and for all strategies in N, N and N, strategies evolve towards the lower left boundary of the space, or towards indiscriminate defection. For sections of P and M where k is su$ciently large, however, strategies evolve towards the upper left; they become more cooperative, but eventually reach a region on P where x evolves to smaller values.
which lie in each region of the space re#ects how &&successful'' strategies in that region are, or how unlikely it is for strategies of this type to be invaded or to drift to zero frequency. This feature allows us to use the "nal sequence to build a probability distribution in strategy space, re#ecting the success and overall robustness of every type of strategy. Using this method, we simulated the long-term evolution of the system, starting with strategy I and producing 100 000 new strategies successively. Each strategy played a single game against each putative successor, with b"5 and c"1. We simulated the game with an average of 20 rounds (nN "20) by weighting the payo! in round i by the probability that a game would last to round i, (1!1/nN )G\.
The results of this simulation are illustrated in Fig. 6 . This "gure shows the distribution, over the d}k plane, of 100 000 successive strategies. The "gure illustrates that each of the seven strategy families are represented in this sequence; strategies from any of these families may be &&success-ful''. A clear peak in the distribution appears along the boundaries of the space near k"d"0; strategies near this point are almost entirely defective. We observe a second cluster of strategies along the M}P boundary above k"c/b"0.2; these strategies are cooperators. In the error-free game, this is a region of apparent Nash equilibria (Wahl & Nowak, 1999) .
A signi"cant fraction of the strategies in this sequence are cooperative: 18% are members of strategy family P, and 20% have payo!s against themselves which are greater than 0.9(b!c), or more than 90% the maximum possible payo! in a game against an identical strategy; 21% of the strategies in the sequence are members of family P, the defectors. The remaining strategies are divided between strategy families as follows: 10% P; 13% M; 24% N; 7% N; 7% N.
The lower panel in the "gure shows a frequency histogram of the payo! each strategy in the sequence receives against itself (solid line). Again we see that the number of cooperators in this sequence of strategies (area under the rightmost peak) is slightly less than the number of defectors (leftmost peak). The correlation coe$cient between F(S, S) and x was 0.60 in this sequence. The correlation between the payo! and k was 0.07; between the payo! and d, !0.06. The dotted line shows the payo! distribution for a sequence of strategies generated as described above but with b"10. Under this condition, cooperation is more favorable and cooperators (P) actually outnumber the defectors (P) 2 : 1.
Discussion
In the continuous Prisoner's Dilemma without errors, we found that the value of the initial o!er, x , was a critical factor in determining the longterm success and payo! of a strategy (Wahl & Nowak, 1999) . We observe similar behavior in the game with errors, "nding that the value of the inital o!er is a strong predictor of the payo! a strategy receives against itself. In addition, CONTINUOUS PRISONER'S DILEMMA WITH ERRORS ᭣ FIG. 6. Distribution of strategies determined by stochastic adaptive dynamics. A sequence of 100 000 successive strategies was generated by stochastic adaptive dynamics, for an initial strategy I (b"5, c"1, p"0.1 and nN "20) . The distribution of these strategies is illustrated on the d}k plane (top panel). The plane was divided into pixels (width"height"0.02), and the number of strategies in each pixel was determined from the sequence. The results were mapped to a three-level grey scale and then smoothed by Gouraud shading. The "gure illustrates that successful strategies are more often defective (towards the lower left corner of the "gure) than cooperative (upper right), but we see a cluster of cooperative strategies along the boundary of M and P. The lower panel shows a histogram the payo! each strategy in the sequence receives against itself (solid line). The distribution has three peaks; the number of strategies in the peak corresponding to cooperators (rightmost peak, high payo!) is slightly less than the number of defectors (leftmost peak, low payo!). The dotted line shows the payo! distribution for a sequence of strategies generated with b"10; in this case the cooperators outnumber the defectors. evolutionary successful strategies evolve towards values of x that elicit complete cooperation in a partner in a single move, rather than building up trust gradually.
Given a strategy y"S(x), we modelled errors by setting y"S(u), where u is a random variable. This method assumes that errors occur in the interpretation of an opponent's move. Another way to incorporate errors would be to allow errors in implementation, such that y"u3[S(0), S(1)] (implementation is consistent with S) or y"u3 [0, 1] (implementation is independent of S). These methods are not equivalent for most strategies. We note that the noise model used here is an extreme case, where the player has no information about the opponent's move. To model a less extreme case, each of the implementations described above could be modi"ed such that the distribution of u is a function of either the opponent's previous move, x, or the correctly implemented response, S(x). The behavior of natural systems should lie somewhere between the predictions of the error-free model and the behavior predicted when the noise is completely unrelated to the signal.
In the continuous game with errors, we observe a general pattern of interaction between classic strategy types that is analagous to patterns observed in the discrete error-prone game. When the bene"ts of cooperation are su$ciently high, we "nd that AllD dominates AllC, that I (analagous to Tit-for-Tat in the discrete game) and AllC are in equilibrium with each other, and that I and AllD form a bistable equilibrium. For other cooperative strategy families which we investigated, we found in general that strategies behave similarly to either I or AllC, making transitions between the two behavior patterns along boundaries in the k}d plane.
Along one such boundary, we observed a set of cooperative strategies which are Nash equilibria in the game without errors (Wahl & Nowak, 1999) . In the error-prone game, however, we "nd 334 FIG. 7 . The dynamics of cooperation. Cooperative strategies (region 1) are able to invade defectors (region 3) by overcoming an invasion barrier. These cooperators are resistant to invasion by less cooperative strategies, but can be invaded, through either selection or drift, by strategies that are more cooperative (region 2). The population of more cooperative strategies, however, is not resistant to invasion by defectors. This system will either cycle between the three regions of state space, or reach an interior stable equilibrium, a mix of the three strategy types. that this subfamily of cooperators is no longer neutral with respect to slightly more cooperative strategies. Near neighbors of this subfamily are able to invade, and the system evolves towards greater cooperation, often reaching a state which is vulnerable to invasion by defectors.
Despite this eventuality, however, cooperative strategies persist for long stretches of our adaptive simulations, as illustrated in Fig. 4 . When the cost-to-bene"t ratio is su$ciently low, cooperators outnumber defectors in the overall strategy distribution, and likewise the frequency of essentially cooperative strategies (payo! against self is high) is greater than the frequency of essentially defective strategies. Even when b!c"1, a cooperative peak in the distribution persists.
This peak occurs along the boundary of strategy families M and P, where strategies are optimistic (make high initial o!ers) and generous (always cooperate a little more than their partner did in the previous round), but uncompromising (only cooperate fully if their partner does). The most successful cooperative strategies in our model o!er intermediate to high values of x , di!ering in this way from Raise-the-Stakes, as proposed by Roberts & Sherratt (1998) . We note, however, that when our strategies meet an opponent who is initially reticent to cooperate, they respond with a low second move (d(1!c/b), and continue attempts to raise the stakes from there.
In our analytical treatment of the payo! function for the classic strategy types mentioned above, we repeatedly found that condition (4), determined the qualitative behavior of the system. This condition requires that the bene"t of cooperation, scaled by a quality factor (the probability of interpreting a move correctly), is greater than the cost. When condition (4) is met, we "nd that I and AllC are in equilibrium, that a starting frequency of I can invade AllD, and that I is stable against invasion by AllD.
For the strategy family P I\I , we found that condition (16) determines the qualitative behavior of the system. Here again the condition requires that the weighted bene"ts of cooperation outscale the costs. When this condition is met, we "nd that strategies in subfamily P I\I are stable against invasion by AllD, and that P I\I can invade AllD if seeded with a su$ciently large frequency. P I\I dominates I when this condition is met, and is in equilibrium with AllC. In summary, we "nd that P I\I dominates and behaves in qualitatively similar ways to I when condition (16) is met, and dominates and behaves similarly to AllC when condition (16) is not met. We found similar results for subfamily P I ; the de"ning inequality in this case is condition (21).
Each of conditions (4), (16) and (21) can be rearranged to predict an error threshold. We therefore "nd that as the error rate, p, increases, the system shifts qualitatively in a way that is equivalent to reducing the bene"ts of cooperation. Larger subsets of the cooperators become vulnerable to invasion by defectors as the game becomes increasingly error-prone. Given the different restrictions on k for conditions (16) and (21), we see that condition (4) is necessary for either of the other conditions to be ful"lled. Thus, the decisive feature in the continuous Prisoner's Dilemma with errors is whether the bene"t, scaled by the probability of interpreting a move correctly, exceeds the cost. When this is true, cooperation is worth the risk.
Finally, our analysis suggests a fundamental pattern of cooperation and defection, illustrated in Fig. 7 . Cooperative strategies (region 1) are CONTINUOUS PRISONER'S DILEMMA WITH ERRORS able to invade defectors (region 3) by overcoming an invasion barrier. These cooperators are resistant to invasion by less cooperative strategies, but can be invaded, through either selection or drift, by strategies that are more cooperative (region 2). The population of more cooperative strategies, however, is not resistant to invasion by defectors. This system will either cycle between the three regions of state space, or reach an interior stable equilibrium, a mix of the three strategy types. It is likely that such oscillatory dynamics are the underlying basis for every model of cooperation (Nowak & Sigmund, 1989) .
